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Abstract 
In 2006, the Treasury introduced a new Film Tax Credit for British productions. 
Fiscal incentives in the form of tax credits are now regarded as fundamental to the 
sustainability of the British film industry. In addition to benefiting indigenous 
filmmaking, an attractive tax credit structure is seen as promoting inward 
investment, chiefly from the USA, and is seen as important for maintaining the 
work force and organisational capacity in the British film industry. Securing the 
continuity of the skills base is at the heart of the UK Government’s drive to make 
the ‘creative economy’ better fitted for global competition. However, in that 
broader context, film has been – and remains - a special case, as it is not presently 
Government creative economy policy to use fiscal measures for other industries. 
We argue that in seeking solutions to longstanding problems of ‘sustainability’, 
contemporary UK policy is conditioned by its long history of economic intervention 
in film production – and has been an important precursor of today’s creative 
industries policy. Furthermore, in current global conditions, it is crucial to consider 
the fundamental cross-currents set in train by the competing demands of US inward 
investment and EU regulation. By undertaking interviews with key players as well 
as examining evidence in the public domain, this article analyses the complex 
politics that has shaped the implementation of this policy. We argue that film policy 
research needs the added depth that such sociological analysis brings to the table. In 
particular, this empirical approach gives insights into how the low politics of 
lobbying and inter-departmental rivalry shape present policy outcomes. 
 
Introduction 
This essay examines recent changes to the tax relief system for film production in the UK. 
To date, scant attention has been paid to the complex politics underlying and impacting 
on the implementation of film policy. Nor has the role of different actors pursuing 
competing interests in the policy process received the scholarly attention it merits. Aside 
from anatomising these aspects of film policy, our analysis, therefore, also has a 
methodological purpose. In addition to interrogating a range of documentary evidence, 
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we have gone behind the scenes to interview key players involved in influencing and 
making policy. This sociological approach adds explanatory richness to film studies. It is 
important to underline the fact that behind policy as a product there is policy as a process 
– a recognition that points us to another level of explanation for outcomes that are 
publicly known and debated. It is striking, however, that in ostensibly democratic 
political cultures, very few know and understand the background strategies inherent in the 
policy process. This is especially so for of film policy – as compared say, with 
broadcasting policy. That is because film policy generally receives little sustained public 
attention. It is, moreover, a sporadic object of major policy intervention, unlike 
broadcasting. And it is much more arcane: the consultations are few and highly limited in 
whom they invite into the discussion, as may be seen from what follows. 
 
Fiscal incentives for film production in the form of tax relief – the subject of this article - 
are a relatively recent feature of British film policy. This form of subsidy is given to 
particular industries when ‘market failure’ means that ‘sustainability’ without support is 
impossible. Once set up, therefore, film tax incentives are a mechanism for delivering 
subsidies to an industry without the direct intervention of government officials. The 
Conservatives were the first government to introduce this kind of support in 1992 when 
they brought in Section 42 of the Finance (No.2) Act. New Labour introduced a second 
tax incentive, Section 48 of the Finance (No.2) Act, when they entered office in 1997. 
This dual-clause tax structure was in place until 2004, when it was reviewed and 
overhauled, in part due to alleged abuses of the system. The legislation detailing the new 
Film Tax Credit (FTC) to replace Sections 42 and 48 was eventually contained in the 
2006 Finance Bill and Finance Act in the same year. 
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 We shall first sketch the history of government intervention into British film policy 
leading up to the recent tax relief incentives, noting the various forms of state aid 
provided to the industry. Our account highlights both change and continuity in film 
policy, illustrating how governments of different political persuasions have addressed the 
question of state aid for film from the 20th Century into the 21st. We argue that UK film 
policy exhibits continuity in its governing assumptions. First, there is a longstanding 
emphasis on the importance of safeguarding national identity through maintaining a film 
industry. Second, this is coupled with a recurrent need to invent new forms of economic 
intervention as older ones are deemed to have failed. If the wheel is not being reinvented, 
it is certainly being refurbished regularly. These two key elements – cultural nationalism 
and economic intervention – are at the heart of the UK Government’s present ‘creative 
economy’ policy.i It is too little recognised that historically, film policy, has provided one 
of the templates for New Labour’s decade-long attempt to steer the creative industries 
towards global competitiveness. However, film remains a special case, as it has not been 
UK Government creative economy policy to intervene in any other industrial sector using 
fiscal measures. 
 
Against this backdrop, we analyse a key aspect of New Labour film policy, namely the 
review of fiscal incentives and the implementation of the new FTC in 2006. As we shall 
show, the FTC is a policy shared between HM Treasury and the Department for Culture, 
Media and Sport (DCMS). The Treasury, which controls government expenditure and 
taxation, formulates fiscal policy. It was the Corporation Taxation Team in the Treasury 
that devised the new FTC. However, UK film policy falls mainly under the remit of the 
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DCMS, which consulted with the Treasury over how the FTC was to be formulated. As a 
small and relatively weak ministry, the extent of the DCMS’s influence in fiscal film 
policy is a moot point, although as we show later, the DCMS did devise the so-called 
Cultural Test, which articulates directly with fiscal measures and determines whether 
films qualify for tax incentives. In 2007, administration of the Cultural Test was passed 
on to the UK Film Council (UKFC), a non-departmental public body (NDPB) formed by 
the New Labour government in 2000. The UKFC (originally called the Film Council) acts 
as the strategic body for film in Britain. The role of the UKFC in influencing the FTC is 
examined below. 
 
As our epigraph shows, the ‘sustainability’ of the British film industry is a current policy 
goal. What this actually means in policy terms is one of the themes of this article. A 
policy of sustainability is presently being pursued within a field of competing interests. In 
line with our sociological approach, we argue that it is essential to understand the 
interplay of these forces in order to grasp how current policy positions are shaped. At a 
global level, two key vectors need to be taken into account. On the one hand, there is the 
longstanding need to provide a system sufficiently attractive for the major US studios to 
make big budget films in the UK.ii At the same time, however, it is also necessary to meet 
the requirements of the European Commission, for which ‘indigenous’ production 
conducted within the rules of the EU’s Single Market remains a policy priority. To 
elucidate the processes at work, our account therefore identifies crucial moments in recent 
film policy, highlights key actors involved in the policy-making process and also 
considers the role of the different governing parties, ministries and stakeholders at various 
stages of policy change.  
 4
 A brief history of state intervention 
John Hill has argued that film policy in the UK has a pre-eminently ‘protectionist’ cast as 
it is ‘concerned with the preservation and support of commercial [British] film making’ in 
the face of Hollywood competition.iii Early types of state aid from the 1920s took the 
form of a quota system and cultural subsidies and were in reaction to the fear of US 
economic and cultural domination of the British film industry. The quota system – 
introduced by the 1927 Cinematograph Films Act - was the first UK government 
intervention and the Act required renters (distributors) and exhibitors to acquire and show 
a certain percentage of British films.iv In 1936, the Moyne Committee was set up to 
‘consider the position of British films’. The Committee recommended that the quota 
system be extended, although it noted the trend towards producing ‘quota quickies’ and a 
quality test was suggested to ensure that British films registered for the quota were of a 
high standard. American distributors’ screening of low quality, cheaply produced British 
films was seen as being against ‘the spirit of the [Cinematograph Films] Act’, which was 
intended to support a struggling indigenous film industry.v Moreover, some Hollywood 
studios had early recognised the strategic importance of Britain in the global film market. 
Setting up UK subsidiaries, companies such as Paramount and MGM, could employ 
British citizens and thus meet the demands of the quota system.vi  
 
During the late 1940s, following the end of World War II, the British film industry fell 
into crisis through lack of film finance and high post-war production costs. Despite the 
quota system fewer British films were being made for exhibitors to screen. Hollywood’s 
continued domination was a key concern across Europe. So much so that after the war 
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more measures were put in place in many countries to further protect indigenous 
industries from US imports.vii The Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) 
formed the Motion Picture Export Association (MPEA, later the MPA) to lobby on behalf 
of the Hollywood majors in response to these restrictions. Yet, in the face of this 
exclusion, the strategic importance of Britain to the US studios increased due in part to a 
shared language, but also because of the size and accessibility of its film market. 
Moreover, as a principal ally, Britain had influence in Europe, an important factor in 
pending general trade agreements on film.viii In April 1949, the National Film Finance 
Corporation (NFFC) was set up under the Cinematograph Film Production (Special 
Loans) Act to distribute loans for British film production.  
 
With the quota system now firmly established (despite MPEA lobbying to abolish it) and 
the NFFC in place, the introduction of a trade subsidy in 1950 called the Eady Levy 
marked the end of a period of intense activity in UK film policy. The Eady Levyix, a 
system proposed by Harold Wilson MP, then President of the Board of Trade, required 
exhibitors to retain a proportion of the ticket price and give half of this sum to fund 
British film production. The government sought to support indigenous film production 
with a scheme that would not be regarded as a subsidy. This approach was shaped by both 
external and internal factors. First, the scheme had to accord with the rules of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) regarding state aid for film. And second: 
The Treasury was opposed to a subsidy paid out of box office receipts because of a general 
dislike of parafiscal aids and an attachment to the principle that special taxes, like road tax, 
should be treated as a general revenue. There was also a danger that any form of subsidy 
would encourage other industries to clamour for similar favours.x
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Initially introduced as a voluntary scheme, the Eady Levy became compulsory under the 
1957 Cinematograph Films Act and was administered by the British Film Fund Agency 
(BFFA) set up in that year.  
 
The film industry in Britain subsequently came under pressure due to the spread of 
television and the immense popularity of this new medium. The domination of the US 
film industry also remained a global problem. During the 1950s, Hollywood majors, such 
as MGM, Columbia and Fox, continued to make films in Britain through their 
subsidiaries, as not only was technical talent cheaper, but they could take advantage of the 
state incentives meant to help indigenous producers.xi Into the 1960s, the major US 
studios continued to be the main investors in British film, and in 1967, 90 percent of 
funding for ‘British films’ came from the US with investment peaking in 1968 at £31.3 
million.xii The structure of state support for film, comprising the Eady Levy, the NFFC 
and the quota system, remained in place and was renewed in successive Acts of 
Parliament in 1960, 1967 and 1970. However, with America in recession during the 
1970s, the US studios withdrew and UK government interest in the film industry was 
reignited. In August 1975, Harold Wilson, now Labour Prime Minister, set up a Working 
Group to report on ‘the requirements of a viable and prosperous British film industry over 
the next decade’.xiii The Future of the British Film Industry report was published in 
January 1976. Among its recommendations was the formation of a new British Film 
Authority, which would consolidate all the government’s film-related activities and bring 
together the NFFC and BFFA.  
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A significant change in policy came in 1979 when the Conservatives entered office and 
Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister. Over the course of its first five years in 
power, the new government set about removing economic support thus transforming how 
cultural subsidies were distributed for film production. In 1981, the NFFC was 
restructured and its state funding dramatically reduced. In January 1983, the quota system 
was suspended. Then in July 1984, the White Paper on Film Policy suggested scrapping 
the Eady Levy and the NFFC altogether to further rid the film industry of ‘the 
paraphernalia of Government intervention’.xiv These proposals were subsequently 
implemented in the 1985 Films Act along with the abolition of the Cinematograph Film 
Council (CFC) and the BFFA. The NFFC’s assets were transferred to a private company, 
British Screen Finance Ltd, in which the private sector (initially Channel Four, Cannon 
and Rank) invested. Finally, in 1986, a fiscal measure, which had made films eligible for 
100 percent capital allowances in the first year, was phased out.xv   
 
As John Hill has argued, the removal of economic support for film production ‘was not 
simply destructive’ as the effectiveness of the Eady Levy and the quota system had 
become increasingly questionable.xvi The NFFC had long been regarded as an 
organization constrained by ‘inadequate funding resources and … having to function 
strictly on commercial lines’.xvii, although it provided an important lifeline for 
independent producers. Meanwhile, the value of the Eady Levy fund, determined by 
cinema admissions, had decreased with the decline in cinema-going. As producers 
received a proportion of the fund in relation to the box office success of a film, the fund 
tended to pay out to the more successful filmmakers rather than those most in need. 
Similarly, the quota system had never proved to be particularly effective. During the 
 8
1970s, when the number of registered ‘British’ films dropped by half, largely due to the 
withdrawal of the US studios from British film production, many cinemas failed to screen 
the required percentage of indigenous productions.xviii Meanwhile, some argued that the 
phasing out of the 100 percent capital allowances tax shelter encouraged ‘those with 
gumption and ingenuity to [find] imaginative ways out of a desubsidised environment’.xix
 
However, as economic subsidies for film were dismantled, no alternatives were proposed. 
It would seem that, taken in the round, economic measures did have an impact on output 
as following their complete withdrawal film production went into decline and in 1989 
only 30 films were produced in Britain.xx The US studios had returned during the 1980s 
to make their own films but not to invest in British films. In 1986, £270.1 million was 
invested in British film production but this fell to £135.7 million in 1988 and declined 
further to £49.6 million in 1989xxi with filmmakers relying in the main on two key 
funding sources - British Screen and Channel Four. In June 1990, a seminar was held at 
Downing Street, chaired by Prime Minister Thatcher, to review the film industry and 
consider future issues. These included discussions on US inward investment and the 
promotion of British films abroad. Head of Universal Studios, Lew Wasserman was 
invited indicating the importance of Hollywood in any debates on the UK film industry. 
Moreover, the position of the industry in Europe was also considered given the launch of 
pan-European initiatives. Eurimages (the Council of Europe’s fund to support co-
productions)xxii began in 1988 and MEDIA I (the programme to stimulate growth and 
competition among Europe’s audiovisual industries) in December 1990. The government 
subsequently set up working groups to discuss the key matters, one being the use of fiscal 
incentives for production investment.xxiii In 1991, to stimulate wider debate, the BFI 
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produced the ‘UK Film Initiatives’ series of pamphlets. This included Michael Prescott’s 
The Need for Tax Incentives, which argued that fiscal support was essential, alongside 
other forms of state aid, to encourage investment in British film production and enable 
British filmmakers to compete on a ‘level playing field’ with other countries offering 
these incentives in Europe, Canada and Australia.xxiv
 
It has been argued that the momentum for change in British film policy slowed down 
when John Major replaced Margaret Thatcher as Conservative Prime Minister in 1991, 
reflecting uncertainties in the government about how best to proceed.xxv Nonetheless, the 
initiatives put in place by Major’s administration during the 1990s had a far-reaching 
impact on film policy into the next century. In 1992, the Chancellor, Norman Lamont, 
introduced fiscal support for the film industry in the form of tax relief covered by a clause 
in the Finance (No. 2) Act. Section 42 was also referred to as ‘large budget tax relief’ and 
provided incentives for films with budgets in excess of £15 million. Also in 1992, the 
Department of National Heritage (DNH) was established, with responsibility for policy in 
culture and the arts, leisure, tourism and sport. Funding opportunities for the arts 
expanded with the new National Lottery established by Act of Parliament in 1993. 
Regional Arts Councils were in charge of allocating the Lottery money to film projects. 
The distribution of Lottery funds was initially confined to capital projects and it took 
intense lobbying from some to have film accepted as a capital asset.xxvi  
 
However, lack of private investment in the British film industry was an enduring problem 
and in 1995, the then Secretary of State for Heritage, Stephen Dorrell, MP, set up an 
advisory committee to explore the main obstacles to industry growth.xxvii The Advisory 
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Committee on Film Finance, led by the banker, Sir Peter Middleton, was subsequently 
formed with members from the worlds of finance and film. The committee reported in 
July 1996, pointing to structural problems in how the industry was organized, financial 
problems (including lack of expertise on film finance in the City) and an overall lack of 
communication between the industry and the City.xxviii Meanwhile, the Arts Council of 
England (ACE) commissioned a report by Spectrum Strategy Consultants, published in 
May 1996. This explored the feasibility of film franchises ‘expressly designed to create 
vertically-integrated companies’ with a sustained level of output to encourage 
investment.xxix ACE subsequently invited bids for £96 million of Lottery money to be 
distributed to three film franchises over a six-year period. These were awarded to The 
Film Consortium, Pathé Pictures and DNA Films and the franchises were set up in May 
1997, just after the election of the New Labour government. 
  
New Labour film policy 
The past two decades, therefore, have seen shifts in policy that have confirmed the 
perceived importance of film to the national economy. This view has been shared by both 
Conservative and Labour governments.  During the 1980s, the Conservatives first 
removed all economic support from a film production sector already struggling through 
lack of state aid and private investment. However, during the early 1990s, support was re-
introduced through the fiscal system and Lottery funding. In May 1997, the very week 
that the film franchises were awarded, New Labour, led by Tony Blair, won the General 
Election. The DNH was quickly renamed the Department for Culture, Media and Sport 
(DCMS) and the new government set about investigating the state of the British film 
industry. In 1998, the Treasury under the new Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon 
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Brown, introduced Section 48 of the Finance (No.2) Act - a second fiscal incentive, 
which applied to film productions with budgets below £15 million. In contrast to Section 
42’s ‘big budget’ emphasis, aimed at attracting inward investment (mainly from the USA) 
to the UK, Section 48 was the ‘low budget tax relief’ and intended to help indigenous 
independent filmmakers.  
 
Also in 1998, the Film Policy Review Group (FPRG) was set up by the Labour 
government to explore issues relating to British film and identify initiatives for future 
film policy. The FPRG was jointly chaired by Tom Clarke, Minister for Film and 
Tourism in the DCMS, and Stewart Till, President of International PolyGram Filmed 
Entertainment, whose appointment as co-chair reflected the special status that global trade 
and distributor interests were given in the review. The FPRG and its six sub-groups 
comprised some 50 members who were predominantly film company executives.xxx 
Fiscal policy did not fall under the remit of any sub-group as it was now regarded as an 
issue for HM Treasury, whereas the Film Policy Review was a joint initiative between the 
DCMS and the UK film industry. Despite this, the FPRG’s Film Finance subgroup did 
make recommendations regarding fiscal issues and these were published in the exercise’s 
final report A Bigger Picture. There, it was reported that ‘the industry members of the 
Group agreed unanimously that this was one of the most important issues under review, 
and that the results of their discussions about the fiscal climate for film investment should 
be recorded’, although it was conceded that the DCMS could not endorse their comments 
on this matter.xxxi The subgroup made a number of recommendations, including that the 
recently-introduced Section 48 should be extended beyond its current three-year time 
limit to encourage inward investment from the US; that the beneficiaries of the tax 
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incentive should contribute to industry training, and that an additional tax incentive 
should be introduced to encourage investment in the film business. Finally, the subgroup 
endorsed the earlier recommendation of the Middleton Committee to establish a Film 
Finance Forum to develop further tax relief systems and do the necessary economic 
modelling for these proposals.xxxii      
 
The FPRG appears to have influenced policy outcomes. Although Janet Anderson, who 
replaced Tom Clarke as Minister for Tourism, Film and Broadcasting in 1998, questioned 
‘the ability of an “Action Committee” with as many as 40-50 people to act’, she did 
identify key achievements of the FPRG: the setting up of a Skills Investment Fund, the 
opening of the British Film Office in Los Angeles and the establishment of the British 
Film Commission.xxxiii But in illustration of the difficulties in tracing the precise impact of 
such policy exercises, Anderson also credited the setting up of a new Film Finance Forum 
and the implementation of a new tax incentives structure to the FPRG, despite the fact 
that both of these ‘achievements’ had already been proposed and implemented before the 
review’s work. Finally, Anderson also referred to the setting up of the ‘long overdue Film 
Council’, which was finally established in 2000. As we shall see, the next phase in the 
evolution of fiscal policy involved activity by a major new actor on the scene.  
 
Setting up the Film Council 
The establishment of the Film Council was regarded as a ‘major shift in Government 
policy for film’xxxiv and was described by its first Chair, Alan Parker, as ‘the most radical 
shake-up of UK public film funding since 1985’.xxxv Despite Janet Anderson crediting the 
Film Council as an achievement of the FPRG, A Bigger Picture had only alluded to a 
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potential new structure and had recommended a review of ‘the machinery for providing 
government support to film’.xxxvi This intention was later developed in the DCMS 
publication The Comprehensive Spending Review: A New Approach to Investment in 
Culturexxxvii and consultation paper A New Cultural Framework by the first New Labour 
Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, Chris Smith.xxxviii These two publications 
stated the government’s intention to set up a new strategic film body overseeing both 
industrial and cultural objectives, which at this point they called British Film. This agency 
would absorb the public and semi-public bodies in the UK concerned with film. Chris 
Smith confirmed that the idea for the new body had been overwhelmingly accepted 
during consultation and the celebrated actor/director and former chairman of the BFI, 
Richard Attenborough, was asked to consult further with the film community in 
developing the shape and direction of the agency.xxxix  
 
As Dickinson and Harvey note, the proposal for a new Film Council was ‘realizing an 
idea with a long history’ as different funding structures for the UK film industry had been 
discussed since the 1940s.xl Harold Wilson, in the mid 1970s, had proposed setting up a 
British Film Authority and his Working Group led to the formation of the Interim Action 
Committee (IAC), which published Proposals for the Setting up of a British Film 
Authority in 1978.xli This proposal was quashed when the Conservatives entered office in 
1979. However, the IAC did continue to meet, discuss and produce further reports on the 
film industry until April 1981.xlii The IAC’s industry representatives considered it to be a 
useful forum for discussion. The IAC subsequently mutated into the British Screen 
Advisory Council (BSAC), funded mainly by annual subscriptions from members across 
the film industry. When New Labour’s FPRG published A Bigger Picture in 1998, BSAC 
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was named as one of the bodies to be consulted on the development of a new structure for 
film policy.xliii BSAC responded positively to the DCMS’s proposals as finally bringing 
about ‘the fulfilment of Harold Wilson’s original objectives’.xliv One source told us that 
the government then asked BSAC if it wanted to become the Film Council. However, 
since its original formation in 1981, BSAC had broadened its remit, keeping up with 
changing technologies and the introduction of new media platforms, thereby evolving to 
represent a transforming audiovisual sector of which film was just a part. 
 
The Film Council was finally launched on 2 May 2000 as a non-departmental public 
body, working at arm’s length from government, with the status of a company limited by 
guarantee (the guarantee being the £1 provided by the DCMS). It absorbed a number of 
public and semi-public bodies in the UK concerned with film including the Lottery Film 
Department of the Arts Council, British Screen Finance, the British Film Commission, 
and the production and regional funding roles of the British Film Institute (bfi). All 
remaining activities in the bfi came under the Film Council’s control. Although the bfi 
retained its formal autonomy, it now received its funding from the Film Council, which 
also appointed the Chair of its Board. The Film Council’s annual budget was composed 
of a combination of Lottery funding (which it was designated to distribute) together with 
a grant-in-aid from the DCMS. At launch, the annual budget came to some £55 million, a 
total that would vary in line with the number of Lottery tickets sold.xlv  
 
The Film Council was set up to act as a conduit between government and the British film 
industry, as its CEO, John Woodward has made clear:  
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The Film Council sits smack in the middle between the Government and the industry, and 
one of its key functions is to act as a kind of translator. Our job is to explain the industry to 
the Government, because the Government … knows relatively little about the film 
industry… And vice versa, the UK Film Council is there to explain the Government to the 
film industry, because the film industry cares relatively little about the Government as long 
as the money’s coming in… I think that perhaps our mistake was not making it clearer from 
the start that the establishment of the UK Film Council did not now mean that the film 
industry had a direct line to Government, and that it would get everything it wanted. It was 
never going to be that way.xlvi  
 
At first, the relationship between the Film Council and government was unclear to many 
of its key stakeholders and the new body’s strategic vision for film in Britain was also 
subject to criticism. It was formed to fuse industrial and cultural objectives and the launch 
document Towards a Sustainable Film Industry (2000) proposed that it work both with 
the US and Europe in developing UK film policy. As with the earlier FPRG, the first Film 
Council Board chiefly comprised business leaders and film industry players with a track 
record in Hollywood, including producers such as Tim Bevan and Duncan Kenworthy.xlvii 
The producer, Alan Parker, was appointed as the first Chair. Such key appointments were 
seen as fundamental in signalling and influencing the early direction of the Film Council 
and placing industrial objectives – and an orientation towards Hollywood - to the fore. 
Some have argued that this approach failed to consider that the British film industry 
might compete successfully against the US studios by building on its differences from 
Hollywood.xlviii Instead, strategy appeared to be more about cooperating fully with the US 
industry to attract inward investment. This was evident from early Film Council 
initiatives such as the expansion of the British Film Commission and the setting up of the 
British Film Office in Los Angeles.  
 
The UK was not alone in its pursuit of US inward investment – other competition had 
come particularly from Canada and Australia since the early 1990s. Dickinson and 
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Harvey have argued that the objective of obtaining tax credits for film has always been 
‘to enable the British industry to compete, not against Hollywood, but against potential 
rivals for Hollywood investment’.xlix The global film industry had become highly mobile 
with US filmmakers seeking out a widening number of locations with competitive skills 
bases and production capacities. Moreover, the US studios would increasingly cost 
several different territories before deciding where to shoot a film, and consider a variety 
of factors, including local skills and services, exchange rates, language, culture and the 
tax incentives on offer. These points were emphasised in a BSAC report to the Film 
Council published in August 2000, in which the UK’s fiscal arrangements were reviewed 
two years on from the introduction of Section 48. BSAC argued that the UK’s indigenous 
film sector was at risk without inward investment from the US studios. The report also 
noted that in the previous twelve months some structural changes had begun to emerge in 
the UK production sector as a result of the fiscal incentives. These included more upfront 
payments to production, direct equity investment in films, direct investment in production 
companies and more distribution deals.l In conclusion, BSAC recommended to the Film 
Council that Section 48 be extended for a further two years beyond its existing expiry 
date in 2002.  
 
The Film Council rapidly addressed the question of tax breaks. At its July 2000 Board 
meeting, only two months after being set up, the Film Council’s Chair, Alan Parker, 
proposed to write to the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, stating that the 
current 100 percent relief should be extended until the Film Council had undertaken ‘a 
comprehensive examination of the current and new incentives which would help achieve 
the government’s objective of a sustainable British film industry’, a decision unanimously 
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agreed by the Board (Film Council Board Minutes, 25 July 2000: 4).li The Film Council 
was subsequently asked by the government to prepare a paper stating the case for 
extending Section 48 (Film Council Board Minutes, 22 August 2000: 2). In the March 
2001 Budget, the Treasury announced its intention to extend tax relief on films until 
2005. Prior to this announcement, executives at the Film Council had met Inland Revenue 
officials to discuss tax proposals. The Film Council had also invited producers to speak at 
Board meetings to illustrate their use of Section 48. A meeting was held with Jack 
Valenti, President of the MPAA in advance of his own meeting with the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer (Film Council Board Minutes, 27 February 2001: 3). Reflecting the easy 
access to Number 11 Downing Street that the MPAA evidently enjoyed, Valenti had told 
the Film Council that the Chancellor would be renewing Section 48 in the forthcoming 
budget. The extension was welcomed by the industry, although this success could hardly 
be attributed to the Film Council’s influence. 
 
Fiscal policy came further into focus in 2002. First, in the March Budget, when the 
Chancellor closed a loophole in Section 48 to restrict relief to films for theatrical release, 
thus preventing television programmes from qualifying. And next in November 2002, 
when the House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport (CMS) Select Committee invited 
responses to the provocative question, ‘Is there a British film industry?’ The call for 
evidence, inter alia, asked for views on the nature of support from government, the 
structure and performance of the film industry, and the performance and approach of the 
Film Council to date. The CMS Select Committee received over 100 written responses 
and papers from a broad range of stakeholders.lii From February 2003, a number of 
witnesses were invited to give oral evidence on these issues. Additionally, the Committee 
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visited film production facilities in the UK (Ealing, Pinewood, Leavesden and Framestore 
CFC) and took a trip to Los Angeles in June 2003 where their programme consisted of 
meetings with all the major studio heads.liii   
 
The committee’s report, published on 18 September 2003, noted that witnesses from the 
UK and the US were almost unanimous in their support for tax incentives. However, the 
‘historical cycle of change in the tax regime’ was said to be ‘a huge disadvantage’ in 
encouraging long-term investment and planning.liv BSAC and the Producers’ Alliance for 
Cinema and Television (PACT) had both argued that structural changes becoming 
apparent in the industry were largely due to fiscal incentives, and to maintain these 
predictability was required, as opposed to the current ‘‘boom and bust’ seven year cycle’ 
(ibid: 32). Meanwhile, the Hollywood studio heads had referred to growing 
competitiveness between filmmaking destinations, such as Canada, Ireland, Australia, 
New Zealand and the Czech Republic, noting that the UK’s current fiscal structure had 
‘created a level playing field’, thereby bringing other criteria ‘such as facilities and talent’ 
to the fore in deciding where a film is made (ibid: 32, 33).  
 
Nevertheless, it was widely believed that Section 48 needed to be revised. The Film 
Council had outlined their ideas for a ‘son of 48’ which would tie in with distribution, as 
well as production. BSAC had similarly promoted a distribution-led strategy in a study of 
potential new tax mechanisms submitted ‘in confidence’ to the DCMS. The CMS 
Committee called for clarity over fiscal policy and support from all the government 
departments with an interest in film to ‘end the current uncertainty plaguing the 
industry’.lv The report had also acknowledged the work of the Film Council (renamed the 
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UK Film Council [UKFC] in May 2003)lvi, which throughout the year had met officials at 
HM Treasury and the Inland Revenue to discuss priorities for a new tax relief. While a 
paper outlining these plans was now in place, the Treasury had reiterated to the UKFC the 
need for the industry to appear united behind the report’s principles ‘in order to command 
serious attention for its proposals’ (UKFC Board minutes, 29 July 2003: 6). 
 
From consensus to crisis 
On 10 February 2004, the Inland Revenue announced that it was closing a loophole with 
immediate effect to prevent tax avoidance schemes whereby tax partnerships were formed 
purely to claim ‘sideways loss relief’. Tax avoidance schemes such as this (also known as 
GAAP [Generally Accepted Accounting Principles] schemes) had become increasingly 
commonplace since the introduction of Section 48 in 1997 and were used by producers to 
raise capital for film production. The practice was to encourage rich individuals to invest 
lump sums in film projects. Such investments were used by investors to reduce their tax 
liabilities. Investors would claim tax relief in return for making over lower sums to film 
producers. By contrast to the mid-1990s, when the Middleton Committee had reported on 
the lack of City expertise for filmmakers (a point reiterated in the FPRG’s A Bigger 
Picture), specialists in film finance able to help producers put together funding plans for 
their films now abounded. Such expertise included asset management companies such as 
Grosvenor Park and Ingenious Media, whose scheme ‘Inside Track’ was created in 2002 
specifically for film investors, and guaranteeing that even if a film made a loss, the 
investor would still receive a tax break under the GAAP scheme.lvii  
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The Treasury’s sudden decision to close this loophole was described in Sight and Sound 
as an ‘almighty jolt’lviii because it came with no prior warning to the industry. It surprised 
producers, film financiers, the UK Film Council, and even the DCMS’s Films Minister, 
Estelle Morris.lix The production of some 40 films financed by the GAAP tax partnerships 
was immediately put into question and high profile productions put on hold included The 
Libertine, Tulip Fever and The Constant Gardener. Filmmakers spoke to the media 
expressing their despair at the closure of the loophole with no advance warning. Kate 
McCreery, producer of The Houdini Girl, which had lost 40 percent of its budget 
overnight, spoke to the BBC about the uncertainty now facing her production team, 
stating that: 
You have to be confident – you have to think that there’s a body like the [UK] Film Council 
that has to be able to sort something else out. Otherwise, what’s the point of having it?lx
 
The UK Film Council lobbyied furiously to protect the affected productions; some 
thought this was ‘with little noticeable effect’.lxi The Board compiled a case for 
emergency funding for 17 productions while acknowledging that the UKFC ‘would 
certainly be blamed for not obtaining full transitional relief for all the films’ (UKFC 
Board Minutes, 24 February 2004: 3). Tessa Jowell wrote to Alan Parker in April 2004 
explaining that the government could not provide any assistance to the films affected 
(UKFC Board Minutes, 27 April 2004: 2). BSAC had also attempted to negotiate with 
government at this time, lobbying unsuccessfully for ‘grandfathering’ (whereby films at a 
certain stage of production could continue under the scheme). Some producers were 
therefore moved to lobby the government directly. For example, John Malcovich, co-
producer of The Libertine, was reported to have approached Hartlepool MP and former 
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Industry Secretary, Peter Mandelson, and Labour peer and former filmmaker Lord 
Puttnamlxii before his production relocated to the Isle of Man.  
 
Production plans were evidently still in limbo when the Chancellor, Gordon Brown, made 
his budget statement on 17 March 2004. Confirming the closure of the tax partnership 
loophole, he also proposed a review of the Section 48 tax scheme with the aim of 
introducing a new tax relief measure that would transfer ‘the available reliefs for British 
made films with budgets below £15 million from the third parties… to pay reliefs directly 
to the film-makers themselves’.lxiii Section 48 had been due to expire in July 2005, so this 
announcement came as little surprise. The clause had been subject to routine ‘abuse’ as 
financiers, lawyers and accountants had found loophole after loophole to exploit. 
Secondary legislation had been passed since 2000 to close loopholes, and for this reason 
Section 48 was losing political credibility.  
 
The Treasury’s intentions for fiscal film policy were confirmed at a reception held for 
film industry representatives at 11 Downing Street on 21 September 2004, hosted by 
Gordon Brown and the Paymaster-General, Dawn Primarolo. Leading filmmakers 
attended, including Sir Alan Parker, Lord Attenborough, Tim Bevan, Andrew MacDonald 
and Barbara Broccoli. The new provisions would not take effect until after Section 48 had 
expired in July 2005. The announcement - ten months in advance - was intended to enable 
filmmakers to ‘plan the finances of films in development with confidence about what the 
tax arrangements will be when those films are completed’.lxiv   
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The Chancellor’s December 2004 pre-budget report ended what had proved to be an 
eventful year for fiscal film policy. As part of a package of measures intended to tackle 
tax fraud more generally, Brown announced the shutting down of further film tax 
avoidance loopholes with immediate effect. In addition to preventing so-called ‘sideways 
loss relief’, this was also intended to prevent ‘double dipping’ (when relief was claimed 
more than once on any given film), as well to stop companies converting tax deferrals 
into tax gains by exiting from film tax deferral arrangements.lxv The need quickly to 
return confidence and certainty to a British film industry thrown into turmoil was also 
restated, with the government promising to complete a review of the fiscal structure for 
film by the end of January 2005.  
 
It was clear that the Treasury was in control of steering the fiscal aspects of film policy. 
Although the UKFC had responded positively to the government’s announcement about 
the new film tax relief in September 2004lxvi it did not react publicly to the pre-budget 
news. Some saw the Film Council’s lobbying credentials as damaged due to the 
unpredictable nature of the policy announcements by the Treasury.lxvii Meanwhile, BSAC 
released a gloomy press notice predicting ‘a dramatic collapse in film production over the 
next few months’ due to the latest set of announcements as US filmmakers would be 
unlikely to invest in the UK without a clear fiscal film structure.lxviii This proved to be the 
case, as the value of UK spend from inward investment dropped from £729.54 million in 
2003 to £548.49 million in 2004 with a further fall to £308.66 million in 2005.lxix
 
In January 2005, Estelle Morris Minister of State for the Arts, reconvened the Tax 
Strategy Working Group (TSWG), which included members from the UKFC, BSAC, 
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PACT, DCMS and the Inland Revenue. A smaller group called the Industry Working 
Group on Fiscal Policy for Film (also known as the Hoon Committee, after its Chair, 
Sociéte Générale’s, Premila Hoon) was subsequently formed to speed up the review 
process. The Hoon Committee’s thirteen members came from the UK film industry as 
well as comprising legal experts and City media consultancies.lxx This group’s influence 
on policy was questionable, according to members interviewed for this research, as few of 
their recommendations were adopted. Arguably the Hoon Committee was formed to 
indicate industry cohesion on policy required by HM Treasury.  
 
Meanwhile, as this ‘official review’ was taking place, the Treasury was carrying out its 
own consultation, as well as liaising with other stakeholders behind closed doors. 
Meetings were organized for independent film producers to meet personally with the film 
taxation team and give their views on policy proposals. Additionally, all the US studios 
met Treasury personnel, as their endorsement of the new fiscal structure was vital. It is 
open to question whether the DCMS and UKFC were centrally involved in these 
discussions. John Woodward has said that he was in direct talks with ministers at this 
time. However, when asked whether the UKFC would work closely with government in 
designing the new tax relief system, Woodward replied:  
The truth is, and I’m afraid that this is an inescapable reality of Government, the Treasury 
doesn’t work that way. They talk to you, they listen, they ask, they take the views and then 
they shut the doors and say, ’Thank you very much, we’ll come back to you‘, and then they 
announce. It’s a fact of political life in Britain.lxxi
 
However, Woodward did accompany a Treasury official to LA in April 2005, where 
they met representatives of the US studios to discuss the uncertainty surrounding UK 
tax reliefs. The studios confirmed that while it was currently not economically viable 
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to make films in the UK, they said they would return if the value of tax relief 
increased. In the meantime, they criticised the ongoing Treasury consultation as ‘one-
sided and not well handled’ (UKFC Board Minutes, 26 April 2005: 2).  
 
The European Union and the Cultural Test 
So far, we have illustrated how a fiscal structure for film has been developed in the UK. 
Fiscal incentives, initially conceived under a Conservative administration, became central 
to New Labour film policy. The approach taken rests predominantly on the need to offer 
attractive tax incentives to encourage inward investment from the US. The influence of 
US stakeholders on government in devising and implementing this framework is clear. 
The pre-eminent role of HM Treasury, the driving force behind the implementation of tax 
reliefs, has been demonstrated, despite the policy being shared with the DCMS.  
 
In 2005, the DCMS announced its intention to introduce a new ‘cultural test’: this would 
determine whether a film was ‘British’ and therefore whether or not it was eligible for tax 
incentives. In this way, a ‘cultural’ criterion was brought together with more self-
evidently economic ones. The cultural test was to replace previous criteria for defining 
films as ‘British’ (outlined in Schedule 1 of the 1985 Finance Act). These had focused on 
the level of UK spend and the number of British film practitioners working on a 
production. The method for testing a film’s British credentials had changed little since its 
introduction in conjunction with the screen quota system in 1927.lxxii  
 
So far, the role of the European Union has figured little in our account. However, the EU 
had become increasingly important in shaping British film policy towards the end of the 
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20th Century. In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty was signed and the promotion of European 
culture was a central principle of this agreement. As noted, in the early 1990s, the UK 
began to participate in pan-European initiatives, such as the then European Community’s 
(EC) MEDIA Programme (focused on industry and competition) and the Council of 
Europe’s Eurimages (which emphasised culture). It was during the 1994 GATT 
negotiations that the EC member states confronted the USA’s dominance in the 
audiovisual sector and acted as a counterweight to the strength of the MPAA lobbyists. 
The EC, largely led by the French, argued that audiovisual ‘goods’ should be treated as a 
‘cultural exception’. The US government and the MPAA argued that this was 
protectionism. The matter was never resolved under GATT.lxxiii In 1998, the Commission 
reviewed ‘state aid’ policies in the European cinema sector. It noted the many different 
forms of support across Europe, arguing for clarity in the legal framework, particularly in 
light of new digital technologies.lxxiv The review found that many state aid initiatives had 
not been notified to the Commission, despite such notification being required by treaty. 
Such was the case in the UK, where the fiscal system set up by the Conservatives in 1992 
was regarded as an investor relief system rather than ‘state aid’ and therefore was not 
notified to the Commission.  
 
In September 2001, the Commission adopted a Communication on the future of the film 
and the audiovisual industry in Europe, which included an outline of the criteria for state 
aid schemes. These are supposed to strike a balance between ‘cultural diversity and 
economic competitiveness’. The Commission has discretion over how it assesses the 
appropriateness of state aid.lxxv The concept of a ‘cultural derogation’ is 
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provided for in the Treaty, which, in principle, ensures favourable treatment for the cultural 
sector, and implements a solution which ensures a balance between the objectives of 
cultural creation, the development of audiovisual production in the Union and compliance 
with Community law on State aid.lxxvi
 
While the criteria included practitioners and expenditure, the Communication first and 
foremost stipulated that Member States must also ‘ensure the cultural content of the 
works supported’.lxxvii To ensure that the UK’s FTC was eligible for state aid, its 
beneficiaries had to produce ‘cultural products’. However, when the DCMS announced 
its proposals for a new Cultural Test in July 2005, the Creative Industries Minister, James 
Purnell, stated that the new test would allow producers a number of routes to 
classification and it was not the government’s intention ‘to dictate the content or subject 
matter of British films’.lxxviii The final framework was published in November 2005 after 
consultation with the industry.lxxix The test comprised a points system for films. To be 
certified as ‘British’ and thus be eligible for tax credits films needed to accumulate 16 
points out of a possible 32. ‘Cultural content’ could be awarded up to 4 points), ‘cultural 
hub’ relating to the location of production and post-production facilities and activities 
could score up to 15 points, and finally, the nationality of key ‘cultural practitioners’ 
could bring in up to a further 13 points.  
 
The fact that the largest single number of points was allocated for being a ‘cultural hub’ 
drew on broader New Labour creative industries policy, which emphasised maintaining 
the UK’s skills base. To this end, film policy now prioritised US inward investment, 
which could benefit from a state aid structure comparable to other film locations around 
the world. This was justified as ‘a positive attempt to develop a sustainable film industry 
through the development of an indigenous film industry in a highly transnational 
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market’.lxxx However, clear tensions were evident, illustrating the UK’s unique market 
position. On the one hand, the UK sought to attract the Hollywood majors, influenced by 
their lobbying when formulating the new FTC. On the other hand, the UK as part of the 
EU had to adhere to the Commission’s rules regarding state aid for film. These rules were 
at odds with the government’s focus on the UK as a ‘hub’ aiming to attract inward 
investment.    
 
It was the UKFC’s task to address these contradictory imperatives, although, as stated 
earlier, from the outset, industrial objectives and relations with the US were at the 
forefront of the film agency’s strategic vision. Meanwhile, relations with the EU were 
more secondary, as was engagement with the Commission’s cultural agenda. That said, 
the Board had acknowledged early on the need for the UKFC to build up and develop its 
relationship with the European Commission (UKFC Board minutes, 25 September 2001: 
11). In May 2002, the UKFC -  together with France’s Centre National de la 
Cinématographie - had formed the European Film Agency Directors’ group (EFADs).lxxxi 
In April 2003, the UKFC published its European Strategy outlining its aims, key activities 
and initiatives, plus the measures for determining the strategy’s success. Additionally, the 
Board held meetings in Brussels to engage with key people at the Commission.  
 
The UKFC worked with the DCMS to devise the Cultural Test. Following industry 
consultation, this was passed by Parliament in April 2006. The legislation detailing the 
new FTC was announced in the March 2006 budget and contained in the 2006 Finance 
Bill, although the government still needed final approval from DG Competition at the 
European Commission. It was at this point, however, that the Cultural Test was rejected 
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because it failed to comply with the Commission’s cultural agenda. This could have 
resulted in a delay in rolling out the FTC and concerned an industry already subject to 
months of uncertainty. The government, therefore, had to negotiate quickly with the 
Commission to amend the test, although, according to one of our sources, many in the 
industry thought that the government had conceded too much.  
 
The amended test differed greatly from the first version, with more emphasis placed on 
cultural factors. It still comprised three key sections, and 16 points was still the required 
pass mark. However, the apportionment of points to each section had changed 
considerably. The number of points for ‘cultural content’ rose from 4 to 16, whereas 
‘cultural hub’ was reduced from 15 to 3. Films could now score no more than up to 8 
points for British ‘cultural practitioners’ (down from 13). Meanwhile, a fourth section 
was added for ‘cultural contribution’, whereby producers could score up to 4 points by 
demonstrating the role of their film in the ‘promotion, development and enhancement of 
British culture’.lxxxii The test was also subject to a ‘Golden Point Rule’: this prevented 
films with no British content except the English language from being made in the UK. 
This aimed at stopping US studios from making US films in the UK and thereby 
becoming beneficiaries of the FTC.lxxxiii  
 
Conclusion 
We have argued in this essay that UK film policy should be understood as the outcome of 
contending political, economic and cultural forces and – at the same time – as the product 
of a long history of state intervention. Since the 1920s, British policy makers have sought 
to address competition from Hollywood by using a succession of economic measures. 
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The most recent of these is the Film Tax Credit. This is just the latest instance of a long-
term policy bias towards giving film special treatment. For HM Treasury, the FTC is first, 
intended to encourage the production of films that might otherwise not be made. Second, 
it is meant to promote the ‘sustainability’ of British film production. And third, fiscal 
policy is supposed to maintain a ‘critical mass’ in the UK’s infrastructure for creative and 
technical skills.lxxxiv   
 
Ensuring the viability of a ‘sustainable’ UK film industry has been central to the UKFC’s 
mission. But it is clear that sustainability does not – and cannot – rest alone on the 
capabilities of either domestic production or public investment. The UKFC’s Statistical 
Yearbook 2007/08 underlines yet again the crucial importance of inward investment 
productions, chiefly from the US studios, which accounted for 71% of overall expenditure 
on production. The rationale for the FTC could hardly be clearer, given the strategic 
dependence of the entire film economy on the core contribution of US investment.lxxxv
 
It is clear from our account that the Treasury’s capacity to control the broad conditions 
that shape the environment for film production in the UK is limited. The British film 
industry has been profoundly shaped by its relationship to Hollywood for the best part of 
a century. Now, as the EU’s impact on competition policy becomes increasingly felt, this 
too has to be factored in, as was evident from the recasting of the Cultural Test under 
pressure from Brussels.  
 
Effective competitiveness for UK plc across all fronts has been a preoccupation of New 
Labour in office from the very start. As the UK’s creative industries have been seen as 
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enjoying a special advantage in the global economy, the DCMS has for more than a 
decade argued for enhancing the importance of this sector. Film – as one of the 13 
industries designated ‘creative’ – has come under the aegis of this policy drive, and 
indeed, formed part of the context in which the UKFC was set up as a bridge between 
government and the film industry. However, as we have shown, the low politics of 
interdepartmental competition has meant that the small and weak DCMS has shaped the 
economic aspects of its policy in line with the Treasury’s thinking. Consequently, while 
at first glance it looks as though the FTC is a quintessential measure of creative industries 
policy, which emphasises the development of the talent base in order to engage in global 
competition, that is far from the case. lxxxvi  The FTC is entirely of a piece with the 
Treasury’s historical interventionism. Film policy has always borne the distinctive stamp 
of the Treasury’s thinking, where the perceived special status of film has resulted in 
distinctive fiscal measures not so far afforded any other of the creative industries. Film is 
somehow seen as a special asset to the national economy and to a lesser extent, as crucial 
to national identity. This standpoint, deriving from longstanding competition with 
Hollywood, has been deeply encoded in British policy-making, irrespective of party. The 
creation of the FTC, devised during Gordon Brown’s watch at the Treasury, undoubtedly 
benefited from the fact that the Chancellor was known to be ‘sympathetic’ to the film 
industry. 
 
Our sociological approach to film policy has begun to unravel some of the plays made by 
the DCMS and the Treasury over the ownership of policy. It has also allowed us to 
illustrate aspects of the complex and obscure dynamics of lobbying that has long 
surrounded film policy and which became particularly prominent under New Labour. 
 31
Expertise – especially that mobilised through the use of film industry figures – has shaped 
the debate and secured policy outcomes. So too have the contradictory pulls across the 
Atlantic of the USA and the EU. British film policy has now reached its most recent fiscal 
accommodation. Just how long this will last – as the new loopholes in the Film Tax 
Credit are discovered and exploited – is quite another question. 
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